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NOTES
The Retirement Equity Act: An Accommodation of
Competing Interests
INTRODUCTION
In many marriages, the most valuable marital assets are the employee
spouse's pension rights.' When a marriage terminates, a court must divide
and dispose of marital property fairly and equitably. However, dividing an
employee spouse's retirement benefits between the parties, unlike dividing
most other marital property, involves the task of interpreting both state
domestic law and federal pension law. In the last several years, dramatic
and fundamental reforms have taken place at both state and federal levels
affecting the status of pension rights as marital property.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA)2 is a major piece of federal
legislation which affects state domestic law concerning the division and
disposition of private retirement benefits upon divorce.3 The Act's purpose
is to improve retirement benefit protection ahd to provide greater equity in
private pension funds for participants and their families. 4 REA amends the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC)6 in several important areas. 7 The significant
change for purposes of this Note is section 104 of REA, which exempts
1. See DiFranza & Parkyn, Dividing Pensions on Marital Dissolution, 55 CAL. ST. B.J.
464, 464 (1980); Soloman, Beyond Preemption: Accommodation of the Nonemployee Spouse's
Interest Under ERISA, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1021, 1021 (1980). Courts have routinely recognized
the importance of pension rights as marital assets. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d
124, 129, 267 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1978).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified in scattered sections at 26 U.S.C.
and 29 U.S.C.).
3. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADrUN.
NEws 2547, 2549.
4. S. Rep. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI.
NEws 2547, 2547.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
6. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), amended by Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, 26 U.S.C.A. 1-9602 (West Supp. 1987).
7. PEA addresses other significant areas which are outside the scope of this Note. Examples
include the assurance of working women's participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans
and automatic survivor benefits to surviving spouses of plan participants. For an overview of
these areas, see Comment, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984: One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back, 37 ALA. L. REv. 163 (1985).
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certain domestic relations orders8 from ERISA's spendthrift clause9 and
preemption clause.10
Prior to REA's enactment, two significant problems prevented parties and
courts from dividing and disposing of pension benefits in a dissolution
proceeding. First, state court decrees ordering the assignment of pension
benefits to the former spouses of plan participants' placed pension funds in
a predicament. A pension plan which complied with a court's order risked
losing its "qualified" status since ERISA's spendthrift clause prohibited such
assignments." Second, all state laws permitting the apportionment of pension
benefits to the former spouses of plan participants arguably were superseded
by ERISA's express preemption of all state laws relating to private pensions.'
2
The extent to which ERISA's spendthrift and preemption provisions affected
state marital property laws (if the provisions affect state laws at all) is an
issue which has prompted much litigation. 3 Under section 104 of REA,
guidelines are established for the disposition of pension benefits between
spouses upon dissolution of their marriage. If followed, the domestic rela-
8. REA defines a "domestic relations order" (DRO) as:
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or
marital property rights of a spouse, former spouses, child, or other dependent of
a participant, and is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including
community property law).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
9. The purpose of the spendthrift clause, aside from serving the convenience of the plan
administrator, is to prevent funds accumulated for the employee's retirement years from being
squandered by the employee. Thus, the clause assures that the benefits will remain intact until
the employee reaches retirement. See id. § 1056(d)(1) ("[e]ach pension plan [subject to ERISA]
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated").
10. Id. § 1144(a). Section 1144 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(b) ....
(c) For purposes of this section: (1) The term "State law" includes all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law ....
Id. § 1144(a), (c) (emphasis added).
11. Id. § 1056(d)(1); S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADrmiN. NEws 2547, 2564.
12. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1025-26. Despite ERISA's express preemption of state
laws, the following cases found the domestic relations orders impliedly excepted from the
preemption clause: Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979). Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924-32
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
13. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1025. See, e.g., Cody, 594 F.2d 314; Francis v. United
Technologies, 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978); American Tel. & Tel., 592 F.2d 118; Stone,
632 F.2d 740; In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Carpenter's Pension Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); In re




tions order will receive the "qualified" status and will thereby be exempted
from the requirements of ERISA. 14
This Note analyzes the complications associated with the division and
disposition of private retirement benefits upon divorce and discusses REA's
solution to these complications. This Note then focuses on REA's attempt
to balance the competing interests of the non-participant spouse, the par-
ticipant spouse, and the private pension system. At present, it is not yet
known how state courts will interpret REA. However, an analysis of post-
ERISA, pre-REA decisions provides a meaningful framework for examining
the ramifications of REA.
Section I of this Note discusses the private pension system and the various
types of pension plans. Section II examines the advantages and limitations
that are inherent in the two distribution methods of pension benefit division:
the present cash value method and the reserved jurisdiction method. Such
advantages and limitations vary depending upon the state's marital property
system, the stages of the pension's vesting and maturity, and the type of
pension plan. Section III discusses the post-ERISA judicial activism of state
courts, REA's response to the activism, and the costs of the response. Finally,
section IV evaluates the advantages of section 104 of REA over the other
two distribution methods, and then discusses the proper role that state courts
and state legislatures should play in future cases involving the division of
pension benefits in a dissolution suit, in light of REA's enactment.
This Note proposes that states must determine a fair disposition of pension
benefits in the event of divorce. They must develop laws which protect both
participant and non-participant spouses during their later years. Such a
disposition must take into account that pension benefits, as marital property,
uniquely provide future security for beneficiaries whereas other such assets
are normally for immediate consumption. Finally, a fair disposition must
embrace the national concern for maintaining a private pension system that
adequately protects the voluntary nature of private pensions. Such a dis-
position mechanism must be developed if REA is to accomplish its stated
goals: improving retirement benefit protection and providing greater equity
in private pension funds for participants and their families. 5
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
A. Private Pensions in General
One of the most important public policy issues confronting the nation
today is how to assure that individuals in their retirement years will have
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). See also S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmit. NEws 2547, 2565.
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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adequate income to meet their needs. 16 The growth in the United States'
population during the last half century has been phenomenal. The general
population has doubled while the number of persons aged 65-and-over has
quadrupled. 7 Social Security, s public employee pension funds, 9 individual
savings, 20 and private pension plans2' provide income for the growing elderly
population. 22 In the last several decades, private pension plans have played
an increasingly significant role in addressing this important national con-
cern.
23
Prior to 1974, the federal government imposed only minimal regulations
on the operation of privately provided retirement programs. 24 However, this
changed in 1974 when, pursuant to the Congressional power to regulate
commerce among the states,25 Congress undertook to strengthen the private
pension system by enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.26
The major objectives of ERISA are to: 1) create national uniformity in
private pension law; 2) encourage the spread of private employee retirement
programs, thereby increasing the number of individuals participating in such
plans; 3) increase the likelihood that participants actually receive benefits;
16. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4890, 4898.
17. D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 3 (4th ed. 1979). In 1920, the pop-
ulation in America of citizens at least sixty-five years of age was approximately 4 million,
whereas in 1978 it had grown to 23.9 million. It is estimated that by the year 2025, population
of persons at least sixty-five years of age will number 50.9 million. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
COM. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P25, No. 702).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-433 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Social Security Act provides for
the administration of a national program of contributory social insurance. Monthly payments
are paid to replace part of the employee's earnings when earnings cease or are reduced because
the employee retires, or becomes disabled.
Under the Social Security Act, all employed individuals are forced to assume some respon-
sibility for the maintenance of retired individuals. However, the federal program was designed
deliberately to provide for only minimum protection. Thus, the private pension plan system is
important for its supplemental role. See D. McGLL, supra note 17, at 7, 28.
19. Some public employee funds include: Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. §
231 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act of 1982, 10
U.S.C. §§ 1401-50 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); and Civil Service Retirement Benefits, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8331-48 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
20. Private and public employee pension plans play a significant role in providing income
to older citizens since individual savings and investments can be wiped out by unforseen illness
of the participant or death of a spouse.
21. The first private plans developed around the turn of the century. These early plans
were considered as mere gratuities from the employer, since the employer assumed no legal
obligation to provide such benefits. D. MCGILL, supra note 17, at 16.
22. W. GREENAUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY iv (1976).
23. See Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce
Proceedings, 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1979); See also Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d 663,
664-65 (Mo. 1982).
24. Wodtke, Congress Is Writing the Wrong Prescription for Employee Benefits, 22 PENSION
WORLD 40, 40 (Feb. 1986).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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4) decrease the likelihood that participants will lose benefits because of strict
forfeiture provisions; and 5) ensure that plans will accumulate and retain
sufficient funds to meet their obligations. 27 Congress recognized the purely
voluntary nature of the private pension system and through ERISA estab-
lished regulations to correct abuses in the system without discouraging the
private business sector from establishing and maintaining pensions for its
employees.2
For the employee, a pension affords some security for his or her retirement
years and rewards the employee for long years of service. For the employer,
pensions attract qualified employees and increase productivity by improving
employee morale. 29 ERISA offers advantages, mainly in the form of tax
incentives,30 for both the employer and employee in order to foster estab-
lishment of, and participation in, pension plans. To qualify for the pref-
erential tax treatment, pension plans must comply with the Internal Revenue
Code and with ERISA's spendthrift clause. 3' The purpose of the spendthrift
clause, aside from serving the convenience of the plan administrator, is to
prevent funds accumulated for the employee's retirement years from being
squandered by the employee or seized by creditors of the employee, thus
ensuring that the benefits will remain intact until the employee reaches
retirement. 32
B. Defined Contribution Plans and Defined Benefit Plans
To fully understand the complexities arising from the disposition of pen-
sion rights upon divorce, it is necessary to examine the basic mechanics of
27. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEvs 4890, 4890-91. See also Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 539 (1975).
28. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4890, 4890-91.
29. Employee morale is elevated through the elimination of the employee's anxiety over
retirement security. Moreover, the employee receives a positive feeling that his employer cares
about the employee's future. Furthermore, the establishment of pension plans may reduce
employee turnover and hence, decrease the costs of training replacements. D. McGiLL, supra
note 17, at 21-22. See Doyle, ERISA and the Non-employee Spouse's Community Interest in
Retirement Pay, 3-4 Comm. PROP. J. 3, 4 (1977); Bonavich, supra note 23, at 4.
30. See I.R.C. §§ 401, 501 (1986); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 401, 501 (West Supp. 1987). Generally,
these incentives are employer contributions that are deductible when made. Neither employer
nor participant is taxed on earnings of the fund, and participant may receive favorable tax
treatment upon receipt of payment from the plan.
31. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2547, 2564.
32. In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 125-26, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Carpenter's Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444. U.S. 1028 (1980).
See Carpenter's Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[Tjhe
anti-assignment [clause] was aimed at preventing employees from assigning away their future
income security for short range benefits . . ").
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
most pension plans. Two general types of retirement plans exist: defined
contribution plans33 and defined benefit plans.34 Under a defined contribution
plan, the employer contributes a definite amount to the fund, and the
employee may be permitted or required to contribute also. An individual
account is maintained for each participant, 35 who bears the investment risks
and benefits. 6 Professional and small incorporated businesses prefer the
defined contribution plan because it offers flexibility and is less expensive
to administer than the defined benefit plan.3 7 Benefits in a defined contri-
bution plan are easily divisible upon the dissolution of a marriage because
individual accounts are maintained for each participant and periodic reports
are furnished showing the investment transactions during the period. Thus,
the value of a defined contribution plan upon divorce is always ascertainable
and becomes merely a matter of reviewing the latest account statement. 38
The other major type of retirement plan is the defined benefit plan.
Under this plan, benefits received are based on a combination of factors
such as the highest income level achieved by the participant, the number
of years worked by the participant, and the age of the participant at
retirement.39 Large corporations most commonly utilize defined benefit
plan. 40 The employer sponsoring the pension plan bears the investment
risks and rewards. 4' Unlike the defined contribution plan, the employer's
annual contributions are not fixed and individual accounts are not main-
tained. 42 Therefore, upon divorce, valuation of benefits in a defined benefit
plan is more difficult than valuation of benefits in a defined contribution
plan. Although a court's determination of whether pension benefits and
rights are marital property is not contingent upon the type of plan, 43
33. The defined contribution plan is also known as a contributory plan. See Pattiz, In a
Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement
Plans, 5 PEPPERINE L. REV. 191, 203 (1978). Common examples of the defined contribution
plan include stock ownership, profit-sharing, and stock bonus. Park, The Division of Private
Pensions in Divorce Actions Since the Retirement Equity Act of 1974, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
9, 10 n.9 (May 1986).
34. This type of plan is traditional. Park, supra note 33, at 10 n.9.
35. See generally Hardie, Pay Now or Later: Alternatives in the Disposition of Retirement
Benefits on Divorce, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 106, 107-09 (1978).
36. Park, supra note 33, at 10 n.10.
37. Hardie, supra note 35, at 107.
38. Id. at 108. The amount of future retirement payments is unknown because the yearly
contributions are invested by the plan trustee, thus the future accounts depend upon market
fluctuations.
39. Pattiz, supra note 33, at 203; Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions,
Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance or Re-
placement Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250, 1258 (1986).
40. Hardie, supra note 35, at 107.
41. Park, supra note 33, at 10 n.9.
42. Hardie, supra note 35, at 107.
43. See generally Hardie, supra note 35, at 107-09 (discussing a court's task in determining
whether certain pension benefits are marital property).
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problems of benefit valuation and allocation vary depending upon the
particular plan in question."
II. RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Marital Property Systems:
Common Law and Community Property Law States
Most states in the last decade have acknowledged that certain retirement
benefits are divisible upon divorce. 4 Although pension benefits are prop-
erty,46 whether they constitute marital property subject to disposition upon
divorce depends on several factors. Such factors include whether a state is
a common law jurisdiction or a community property law jurisdiction, and
whether the benefits are vested47 and matured, 4 vested and non-matured, or
neither vested nor matured.
Marital property laws take two basic forms: common law and community
property law. Currently, forty-two states and the District of Columbia utilize
44. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 42 n.10, 638 P.2d 705, 709 n.10 (1981).
In a defined contribution plan, the current amount of benefits may be determined easily because
individual accounts are maintained. In a defined benefit plan, however, the current amount of
benefits is more difficult to determine because no individual accounts are maintained and the
amount that must be discounted to its present value depends upon such factors as percentage
of salary and years of service. Id. For a comprehensive treatment of 'pension division methods,
see DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 464-69.
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 638 P.2d 705 (1981) ("vested or non-
vested"); In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981)
("vested or nonvested, matured or immature"); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361,
248 N.W.2d 272 (1976) ("vested"); In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639
(1975) ("vested"). For a brief overview of the two systems' positions on these time periods,
see McNamara, Dividing Pension Benefits Upon Divorce, 8 ALI-ABA COURSE MATmAI.s J.
33 (1983).
46. See P. DRUCKER, Tim UNSEEN REvoLUrION: How PENSION FUNtD SocALtsM CAlm TO
AMERICA 149-50 (1976); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371 (1981). In holding
that the right to receive retirement benefits constitutes marital property, the Ohm court explained
the rationale underlying similar decisions in other courts: "[R]etirement benefits are a form of
deferred compensation or wage substitute . .. and the right to receive such benefits being
contractual in nature, a chose in action and thus, property." 431 A.2d at 1374. See also In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
47. A "vested" right in a plan is one in which the right to receive the benefit is not subject
to forfeiture if the employment relationship ends prior to the employee's retirement. Johnson,
638 P.2d at 708 nn.2, 3. A "non-vested" right in a plan is one which is forfeited if the
employment relationship ends before a certain time, such as retirement, death, discharge, or
resignation. Id.
48. A pension benefit matures when the participant has an unconditional right of payment
which only occurs after the conditions precedent to the benefit payment have taken place or
are already in the control of the employee, e.g., early retirement. Williamson v. Williamson,
203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (1962), overruled on other grounds, Brown,
544 P.2d 561.
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a common law property system. 49 Generally, common law jurisdictions, by
statute, require the "equitable distribution" of marital property upon ter-
mination of the marriage. 50 The doctrine of equitable distribution allows
courts to award property legally owned by one spouse to the other spouse,
and recognizes the non-employee spouse's contribution to the marital estate.',
Property division under this doctrine varies among the common law states
because the statute usually requires the court to distribute the property in
a manner that is "equitable," "fair," or "just. '5 2 In addition, trial judges
in common law states exercise wide discretion in disposing of marital property
upon the dissolution of the marriage.53
Unlike the equitable distribution jurisdictions, some community property
states54 require equal division of marital property.5 Community property
states recognize the non-employee spouse's contributions to the marriage
and, more generally, recognize marriage to be a partnership of shared assets. 6
Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is generally consid-
ered "community property" and is subject to division if the marriage is
dissolved. Thus, each spouse owns an equal amount of all community earn-
ings and property. Historically, community property states, as compared to
49. States with common law systems are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri) Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. McNamara, supra note 45, at 36.
50. See Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrines, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 481, 485
(1985).
51. Id. at 484.
52. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34 to 1214 (A)(1) (Supp. 1985) ("equitable"); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (Supp. 1986) ("just"); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.52(d) (Supp. 1986) ("just
and reasonable"); IOWA CODE § 598.21(l) (1981) ("divide all property equitably"); OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.105(I)(e) (1982) ("as may be just and proper in all circumstances").
53. A court's discretion allows it to take into account many variables when disposing of
the marital property. Discretion, however, does not provide divorcing parties guidance to
determine whether it is better to enter into a property settlement or let the court divide the
property. Furthermore, due to the trial judge's wide discretion, a dissatisfied party on appeal
will have the difficult burden of showing that the trial judge abused his discretion. See, e.g.,
Hafner v. Hafner, 406 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("trial court's broad discretion in
determining awards in dissolution proceeding will be overturned only upon a clear showing
that this discretion was abused"); Luedke v. Luedke, 487 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 1985) (trial
judge's decision will be found wanting on appeal only if it can be shown that he abused his
discretion); Hale v. Hale, 439 So. 2d 160, 162 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) ("court has a wide
discretion in awarding ...division of property").
54. States with community property laws are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. McNamara, supra note 45, at 33.
55. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1987) ("divide the community estate of the
parties equally"); IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (1)(a) (1983) ("substantially equal division"). But see
NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.150(1)(b)(2) (1986) ("just and equitable"); WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080
(1986) ("just and equitable").
56. L. WarrzmAt, TE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 29 (1981); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK &
D. WInTEMAN, Ti-E LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.14 (1984).
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common law states, have been more inclined to divide an employee's pension
benefits upon divorce.17 Common law states, however, have begun to rec-
ognize pension rights as marital property. 8
B. Stages of Vesting and Maturity
Whether retirement benefits are found to be marital property depends
upon the time of dissolution in relation to the stage of vesting and maturity
of the pension rights.5 9 The first timeframe covers the period during which
the pension rights are vested and matured.60 During this period, the pension
plan participant has a legal right to receive the benefits if he or she elects
to retire. 6' In community property states, it is uniformly held that vested
and matured benefits are community property6 2 to the extent that the benefits
are earned during the marriage.63 Similarly, most common law states hold
vested and matured benefits to be marital propertyA4
57. Solomon, supra note 1, at 1023.
58. See id. at 1023. See also McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 377 A.2d 697, 699
(1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198, 201-02 (1977); Blitt v. Blitt,
139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144, 147 (1976); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512,
342 A.2d 226, 228 (1975); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518, 520-21
(1975); In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d at 640; In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949,
957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
59. See Meyer, Vested but Unmatured Pensions as Marital Property: Inherent Valuation,
Allocation, and Distribution Problems in Equitable Distributions, 14 RtrronRs L.J. 175, 181-
82 (1982). See also Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Mo. 1982).
60. The three stages are discussed in reverse chronological order, beginning with the stage
which presents the least amount of difficulty in a court's determination of whether pension
benefits are marital property and ending with the stage which presents the most difficulty.
61. If the employment relation ends, the plan participant is entitled to certain benefits at
the time of termination because the plan is both vested and matured. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d at
665.
62. See McNamara, supra note 45, at 33. See also Farver v. Department of Retirement
Sys., 97 Wash. 2d 344, 644 P.2d 1149 (1982); Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1981);
In re Marriage of Gillmore, 629 P.2d 1; Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977);
Johnson, 638 P.2d 705; Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978); Ellett v.
Ellett, 94 Nev. 34, 573 P.2d 1179 (1978); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
63. The equation is the same regardless of the marital property system. In Ohm, 431 A.2d
at 1379, the equation was described in the following manner: "[T]he marital interest in [the
benefit] will be a fraction of that [benefit], the numerator ... being the number of years...
of marriage during which benefits were being accumulated, the denominator being the total
number of years ... during which [the] benefits were accumulated . . . ." Id. (quoting In re
Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979)).
64. See, e.g., Ohm, 431 A.2d at 1371; Gronquist v. Gronquist, 7 Kan. App. 2d 583, 644
P.2d 1365 (1982); Hurtgen v. Hurtgen, 635 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Thompson v.
Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 438 A.2d 839 (1981). The remaining minority of common law states
fail to recognize vested and matured benefits as marital property. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker,
120 N.H. 645, 421 A.2d 998 (1980); In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d
1347 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976). These states, however, factor in the
benefits as economic sources and account for them when distributing the property.
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The second timeframe covers the period during which the participant's
pension rights are vested, but not matured. 65 During this period, the partic-
ipant has a legal right to the benefits. However, the payment of benefits
does not begin until the employee reaches a certain age, retires, or otherwise
terminates the employment relationship. 66 Vested, non-matured benefits are
divisible in all community property states. 67 The courts in most common law
states have held, in a variety of contexts, that a participant's non-forfeitable,
vested, and non-matured pension rights are marital assets. 68
The final timeframe covers the period during which pension rights are
neither vested nor matured. During this period, the participant has no legal
right to receive pension benefits. 69 This stage presents the most difficulties
for courts. Following California's lead, 70 all community property states hold,
or clearly imply, that unvested and non-matured benefits are marital interests
divisible as community property to the extent they derive from employment
during marriage.7' These states base their holdings on a recognition of the
economic importance of pension rights and the necessity of treating them
equitably.7 2 Therefore, unvested benefits are held to be a "contingent interest
in property" and not a mere expectancy.73
Community property states have led the way in recognizing the important
property value of unvested, non-matured retirement benefits and the non-
participant's interest in them. In contrast, common law states have been
65. For example, retirement benefits earned by a thirty-five year old employee with ten
years of service may be fully vested, although not payable until some future date. Until the
date on which they become payable, such as upon the plan participant's date of retirement,
the benefits will remain non-matured.
66. See McNamara, supra note 45, at 34. For an analysis of vested but unmatured benefits
in equitable jurisdictions, see Meyer, supra note 59, at 175-99.
67. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561; Johnson, 638 P.2d at 708. See also
McNamara, supra note 45, at 34.
68. See Bolt v. Bolt, 113 Mich. App. 298, 302, 317 N.W.2d 601, 602-03 (1982); Bachman
v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 28, 621 S.W.2d 701, 703 (1981); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,
123, 437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981); In re Rogers v. Rogers, 45 Or. App. 885, 893, 609 P.2d 877,
881 (1980). For a comprehensive treatment of the vested, non-matured benefits in common law
states, see Meyer, supra note 59. See also McNamara, supra note 45, at 37. Among the common
law states, distinctions exist. The equitable distribution jurisdictions differ on whether, and to
what extent, matured, noncontributory benefits are subject to division upon dissolution of a
marriage.
69. For example, the employee with six years of service usually has not worked long enough
for his pension to vest. Thus, if he resigns, dies, or is discharged, he receives nothing. However,
if he works longer, his pension will eventually vest.
70. In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 569 n.14 ("Pension interests are divisible as
community property whether or not vested and whether or not matured.").
71. See McNamara, supra note 45, at 34. See, e.g., Johnson, 638 P.2d 705; Shill v. Shill,
100 Idaho 433, 599 P.2d 1004 (1979).
72. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 123; Brown, 544 P.2d at 566.
73. See, e.g., Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d at 665-66; Brown, 544 P.2d at 565 ("[Plension benefits
represent a form of deferred compensation for services rendered... [and] ... not an expectancy
but a chose in action, a form of property . .. ").
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reluctant to recognize pension rights as marital property during this time-
frame. Although the majority of common law states hold that unvested and
unmatured benefits are marital property, the treatment of these benefits
varies.7 4 A small minority of common law states still refuse to recognize
unvested and non-matured benefits as marital property because the benefits'
value, and possibilities of vesting, are contingent upon many variables."5
C. Distribution Options Available
After retirement benefits are determined to be marital property and are
added to the marital assets, they must be allocated to the parties. Besides
the varied treatment benefits receive depending upon their stage of vesting
and maturity, retirement benefits receive varied treatment upon division in
dissolution proceedings (when divided). The trial court must select a proper
time at which the disposition of pension benefits may occur. Two alternative
times may be selected: upon dissolution of the marriage, or at some time
in the future. The two methods76 of dividing the benefits are the present
cash value method 77 and the reserved jurisdiction method. 7s Many states
afford trial courts complete discretion in determining which method is ap-
propriate, 79 while other states afford trial courts limited discretion, thereby
suggesting a preference for the immediate disposition of the benefits. 0 The
competing interests of participant and non-participant spouses are not pro-
74. See McNamara, supra note 45, at 40. See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 256 Ga. 97,
344 S.E.2d 421 (1986); Ohm, 431 A.2d 137L.
75. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-2(d) (1985). The Indiana Code states: "The term
'property' means all the assets of either party or both parties, including: (1) a present right to
withdraw pension... ; [and] (2)... retirement benefits that are not forfeited upon termination
of employment .... ." Id. Indiana's new statute places only vested benefits in the marital pot
subject to just and reasonable division. See also Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979) ("too speculative to be treated as marital property").
76. For a practical guide of the advantages and disadvantages of the present cash value
method and the reserved jurisdiction method, see Hardie, supra note 35; DiFranza & Parkyn,
supra note 1.
77. For an overview of the present cash value method, see Pattiz, supra note 33, at 249-
50. See also DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 464-67.
78. For an overview of the reserved jurisdiction method, see Sterling, Division of Pensions:
Reserved Jurisdiction Approach Preferred, 11 Comm. PROP. J. 17 (1984). See also infra notes
86-90, 102-10 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 53. See, e.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 369, 534 P.2d 1355,
1358 (1975) ("[T]here can be no set rule for everyone; the trial court must exercise wise and
sound discretion .... "); Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1983) ("[V]aluation
and division of pension rights is generally a matter for the trial court's discretion .... ).
80. See, e.g., Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265, 269 (Fla. 1986) ("The most
preferable approach involves a reduction to present value. . . ."); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J.
Super. 471, 477, 427 A.2d 76, 79, aff'd, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981) ("Long-term and
deferred sharing of financial interests are too susceptible to continued strife . . . ."); Johnson,
638 P.2d at 709 ("[Tlhe present cash value is clearly preferable in that the reserved jurisdiction
method would require continued court supervision . . ").
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vided complete protection by either method. Therefore, in light of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular case, the trial court must determine
which approach affords each spouse optimal protection.
Under the present cash value method, the pension benefits are assigned
immediately to the plan participant, and other assets of equivalent value are
awarded to the other spouse.81 The court determines the marital interest in
the benefits,8 2 calculates the present value of the interest factoring in con-
tingencies of vesting, maturity and the pensioner's mortality, and awards
half of that amount to the non-participant in a lump sum. 83 The lump sum
is usually awarded in the form of property of equivalent value.14 This method
is generally preferred over the reserved jurisdiction method when retirement
benefits are vested and the marital estate has sufficient property to satisfy
the non-participant's claim without undue hardship to the other spouse.,5
Under the reserved jurisdiction method, the court settles only the formula
for division at the time of the dissolution.8 6 The actual division, however,
is delayed until the retirement benefits are received.8 7 This method, also
known as the "if, as, and when" approach,88 awards the non-participant
spouse's interest in the benefits if the participant is paid, as the participant
is paid, and when the participant decides to retire. 89 The reserved jurisdiction
method is preferred over the present cash value method when the present
value of the retirement benefit is too difficult to determineP°
81. See DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 464. Johnson, 638 P.2d at 708.
82. See supra note 63.
83. This is an oversimplification. When determining the present cash value of an interest
in a retirement benefit, the value must be discounted for many contingencies. For example,
the value must be discounted to reflect mortality, based upon group mortality tables, and the
probability that the participant will remain employed with the same employer. See Hardie,
supra note 35, at 108-09. Furthermore, the actuary must discount for inflation. DiFranza &
Parkyn, supra note 1, at 465-67.
84. Tax consequences flow from each method and should be considered. See Sutherland,
ABA Family Law Section Program: The Economics of Divorce (in a Community Property
Division), 4 Comm. PROP. J. 47, 49-50 (1977); Solomon, supra note 1, at 1024. But see Johnson,
630 P.2d at 710 ("[The court] declines to consider the speculative future effects of taxes and
inflation.").
85. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1024. See, e.g., Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d at 666 ("In any
dissolution proceeding, the most desired result would be a full and final division of marital
property .. "); Taylor, 329 N.W.2d at 79 ("This method is preferred where there are sufficient
assets available ... without causing an undue hardship to either spouse .....
86. DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 467. See Ohm, 431 A.2d at 1379.
87. DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 467. See Johnson, 638 P.2d at 708.
88. Ohm, 431 A.2d at 1379 (quoting Hunt, 397 N.E.2d at 519).
89. Id. See also Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 267 N.W.2d 236, 241 (1978).
"In community-property states, the non-employee spouse's share is set at 50 percent of the
benefits attributable to earnings during marriage. In Wisconsin ... the trial court has the
discretion to determine the appropriate percentage." Id.
90. Where it is difficult to ascertain a present value of the pension interest due to uncer-
tainties regarding vesting or maturation or when the lack of marital property makes it impossible
to award sufficient offsetting marital property to the non-participant, then the reserved juris-
diction is preferable. Ohm, 638 P.2d at 1379.
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1. Advantages and Limitations of the Present Cash Value Method
The present cash value method provides three major advantages over the
reserved jurisdiction method. These are: 1) all transactions between the
spouses are finalized at the time of dissolution; 91 2) the spouse from whose
employment the benefits are derived is awarded them;92 and 3) the non-
participant spouse is awarded an immediate set-off of property.93 By fin-
alizing all transactions between the divorcing spouses, this method benefits
both parties. This benefit is evident when hostility exists between spouses
since it allows the parties to avoid future confrontations about financial
matters. The second advantage directly benefits the employee and indirectly
benefits the employer. Under the present cash value method, the employee
will reap the benefits of his or her long years of service in their entirety,
and because the employee's work morale is high, the employer will benefit
from the increased productivity of the plan participant. 94 A third consequence
of this method is advantageous to the non-participant spouse. The present
cash value method provides the non-participant with immediate control over
his or her share of the marital estate, affording him or her the autonomy
to spend that share however he or she prefers.95
Three major problems arise, however, when the present cash value method
is used. These problems are: 1) pensions and annuities are often difficult to
value;96 2) the participant bears the risk of xVesting; 97 and 3) the non-partic-
ipant fails to receive adequate security for later years. 9 Most commentators
agree that the major drawback of this method is the problem of valuing
pension benefits at the time the marriage is dissolved. Benefits which are
vested and matured, especially if the pension is a defined contribution plan,
present the fewest difficulties. However, when benefits are vested and un-
matured, or unvested and unmatured, the complexity of valuation increases.
Each spouse must employ an actuary to ascertain the present value of the
benefits.
91. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1024; Bonavich, supra note 23, at 31-32. See also Johnson,
638 P.2d at 708-09.
92. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1024. See also Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 437, 599
P.2d 1004, 1008 (1979).
93. Shill, 599 P.2d at 1008.
94. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
95. DuBois v. DuBois, 335 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1983).
96. The difficulty in valuation arises when the benefits are contingent and not matured.
See Sutherland, supra note 84, at 49. See also Bergman v. Bergman, 168 Cal. App. 3d 742,
214 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
97. See Hardie, supra note 35, at 110. See also In re Marriage of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679,
688, 566 P.2d 249, 253, 138 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1977); Johnson, 638 P.2d at 708-09 n.6.
98. The non-participant's lump sum does not receive ERISA's spendthrift clause protection,
unlike the participant's awarded retirement benefits which will remain out of the reach of the
participant's creditors.
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The value of benefits under a defined contribution plan is easier to estimate
because individual accounts are maintained and the most recent account
statement at the time of the dissolution can be provided by the plan ad-
ministrator. 99 However, when benefits are in a defined benefits plan, the
future amount to be received depends on factors which are unknown at the
time of dissolution. Such factors include the highest level of income the
participant will achieve, years of service at retirement, and age at retire-
ment.10 In addition, the valuation must be discounted for the participant's
mortality rate, the probability of the participant remaining with the employer
until retirement, and inflation.'0'
For the participant, the present cash value method may be undesirable
because the participant bears the risks of paying the non-participant spouse
for rights which may never materialize.?0 For the non-participant spouse,
this method fails to provide any security for his or her later years. Even if
the lump sum award is wisely invested with the hope of providing security,
the award does not receive the preferential treatment which the participant's
award receives under ERISA's spendthrift clause. Thus, the non-participant's
award is vulnerable to attachment by his or her creditors.
2. Advantages and Limitations of the Reserved Jurisdiction
Method
The reserved jurisdiction method provides several advantages, as compared
to the present cash value method. The three main advantages are: 1) no
valuation of the benefits is needed; 03 2) risks of vesting are allocated equally
between both spouses;'04 and 3) the non-participant receives some security
for later years. 05 Since only the formula for division is determined at the
time of divorce, the complex calculation of valuation is avoided and spec-
ulation is eliminated. Moreover, the participant does not forego his share
99. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
101. See Hardie, supra note 35, at 108-09; Bonavich, supra note 23, at 28. See also Johnson,
638 P.2d at 709.
102. See, e.g., Hafner, 406 N.W.2d at 593 ("[Participant asserts that] this division results
in a 'gross inequity' because [non-participant] has immediate use of the money, while [partic-
ipant] must wait to get his share until he retires.").
103. The ratio should be adjusted for the fact that the non-participant spouse will receive
his or her share of the benefits only during his or her lifetime. The participant will receive the
total benefits if the non-participant predeceases the participant. Unfortunately, the non-partic-
ipant does not obtain a corresponding benefit if he or she survives the participant, since most
pensions cease upon the participant's death. DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 468.
104. See Sterling, supra note 78, at 24. See also In re Marriage of Fairchild, 110 Ill. App.
3d 470, 442 N.E.2d 557, 66 I1. Dec. 131 (1982).
105. Gillmore, 629 P.2d at 7. However, the non-participant spouse is entitled to the increase
in or accruals on his or her share of the benefit because of the delay in receiving it. Id. See
McNamara, supra note 45, at 42.
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of the marital estate in exchange for pension rights, and both spouses bear
the risks involved with the vesting and maturity of benefits. Also, the non-
participant's share of the pension receives the same protection under ERISA's
spendthrift clause as the participant's share. Thus, the non-participant is
assured of some income flow in the future.
The reserved jurisdiction method raises many problems, some apparent
and others less apparent, due to the method's deceptively simple formula.
The three most obvious problems are: 1) transactions continue between the
divorced spouses; 06 2) enforceability difficulties emerge;'07 and 3) the non-
participant must wait until the participant elects to retire before he or she
can enjoy the rest of the marital property.'" Because many divorces end
with hostility, it may be undesirable to force parties to engage in future
transactions which will often be counterproductive. The problems of en-
forceability arise when the non-participant must collect his or her share from
the participant. A participant's refusal to comply may create a problem
which is difficult to resolve, especially if the participant is not amenable to
process in the non-participant's jurisdiction. Furthermore, enforcing the
decree may be too costly for the non-participant. A third problem exists
because the non-participant spouse must wait until the participant elects to
retire and is thereby foreclosed from controlling his or her share of that
portion of the marital estate.
Besides the aforementioned, obvious problems, the reserved jurisdiction
method has many hidden problems. The three major hidden problems are:
1) the participant may predecease the non-participant spouse;' °9 2) the non-
participant spouse may predecease the participant;110 and 3) the participant
may elect plan options that adversely affect the non-participant's share.",
Pension benefits normally end upon the participant's death. Thus, if the
106. See Bonavich, supra note 23, at 32. See also Johnson, 638 P.2d at 709. Under the
present value method, however, "[t]he former spouses are spared further entanglement because
litigation is completed .. ".
107. See Bonavich, supra note 23, at 31-32; Hardie, supra note 35, at 111. See also Johnson,
638 P.2d at 708-09 (noting that retaining jurisdiction to award the non-participant's percentage
of each benefit payment "if, as, and when" it is paid out presents problems of continued court
supervision and of enforcing the participant's duty to pay).
108. Brown, 544 P.2d at 567. Each spouse is awarded an appropriate portion of each pension
payment as received. Id. However, some trial courts have permitted the non-participant spouse
to receive his or her share at the participant's earliest possible retirement date. See, e.g.,
Gillmore, 629 P.2d at 6.
109. DiFranza & Parkyn, supra note 1, at 468.
110. Id.
111. See Bonavich, supra note 23, at 32. See also In re Marriage of Lionberger, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980). The participant can
further frustrate the non-participant's receipt of awarded portion of benefits. For instance, the
participant can change jobs, move across the country, or even retire in a foreign country. The
ensuing litigation to obtain jurisdiction over the plan administrator and the former spouse in
order to compel compliance can be very costly. Hardie, supra note 35, at 111.
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participant dies prior to, or during, his or her retirement, the non-participant
may receive none, or only a portion, of his or her share. Further, the non-
participant receives his or her share of the benefits from the participant
under the reserved jurisdiction method. If the non-participant predeceases
the participant, then the participant receives a windfall in the form of the
total remaining benefits. In addition, most pensions provide options which
the participant can elect. Since a pension is a contractual obligation between
the employer, who sponsors the pension plan, and the participant, the non-
participant cannot control such an election. Unfortunately, a participant's
election may have adverse effects upon the non-participant's share.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, both the present cash value method
and the reserved jurisdiction method have serious limitations. Neither method
completely protects the spouses' competing interests in the employee spouse's
pension benefits once the benefits are deemed to be marital property. As a
result, solutions at both state and federal levels have been fashioned. The
most promising of these remedies are discussed below.
III. THE RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT: THE COMPROMISE
BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Post-ERISA, Pre-REA Judicial Activism
To fully understand the reasons for enacting the Retirement Equity Act,
and to predict the state courts' reaction to it, state court decisions occurring
after the Employee Retirement Income Security Act was passed, but occurring
before REA was enacted, must be examined. After ERISA's enactment, state
courts battled over whether, and to what extent, ERISA's section 1144(a)
(the preemption clause), and section 1056(d)(1) (the anti-alienation clause),
affected their state marital property laws." 2 The bulk of the litigation took
place in the community property states because these states were more
inclined to recognize pension benefits as a marital asset to be divided upon
divorce. 1 3 Realizing the problems with the present cash value and the reserved
jurisdiction methods of dividing pension benefits, most courts failed to adopt
either approach. Instead, the courts utilized a prototype of REA's qualified
112. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1025-26. See, e.g., Cody v. Rieckler, 594 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
922 (1981); In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal
dismissed sub noam. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
113. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 1023; Doyle, supra note 29, at 3; Sutherland, supra note
84, at 48. See also Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 236 (1978).
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domestic relations order.1 14 The prototype method resembled the reserved
jurisdiction approach to an extent, except that the non-participant portion
of benefits were to be paid directly from the plan.11 5 This new approach
highlighted the ambiguities of ERISA's effects on state marital property
laws.
Most courts, using the notion of an "implied exception" to circumvent
ERISA's preemption and anti-alienation provisions, ordered payments di-
rectly from an employee's retirement benefits to meet family support de-
crees.11 6 These courts harmonized the federal doctrine of preemption with
their state domestic laws by reasoning that Congress merely intended ERISA
to preempt all state laws purporting to regulate the administration of private
retirement benefits, and not to preempt state laws affecting the distribution
of retirement benefits including laws affecting distribution through family
support decrees. 17
Although the state courts overcame the preemption obstacle, they still had
to overcome ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The courts easily distin-
guished this provision to allow an assignment of awarded benefits to former
spouses by relying on ERISA's policy considerations.",8 The courts reasoned
that the anti-alienation provision was directed at preventing employees from
assigning away their future income security for short-range benefits, and to
114. A qualified domestic relations order allows benefits to be assigned to former spouses
without violating ERISA's anti-alienation clause. See Park, supra note 33, at 9. See also infra
notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
115. For example, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Harris, 581 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979), the divorce decree ordered the participant to execute a release of his retirement benefits
directing the pension fund to pay the benefit directly to his former wife. Id. at 301. See also
Monsanto Co. v. Ford, 534 F. Supp. 51, 52 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Ball v. Revised Retirement Plan,
522 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Colo. 1981); Sochor v. IBM, 90 A.D.2d 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d 317,
318 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 60 N.Y.2d 254, 457 N.E.2d 696, 469 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983).
116. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 121 (The court stated that "strict, literal
construction [of ERISA] ... would necessarily lead to the unreasonable conclusion that Con-
gress intended to preempt [peripheral state laws]."); Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 926 (The court
stated that ERISA "does not explicitly prohibit the transfer of pension benefits under state
community property laws."); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371, 1377 (1981)
("[Flor pre-emption to occur, state law must do damage to substantial federal interests.").
117. In American Tel. & Tel., the court adopted the rationale that "the 'fundamental principle
of statutory interpretation [is that] courts have presumed that the basic police powers of the
states, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not superseded by federal legislation
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " 592 F.2d at 122 (quoting
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Cody, 454 F. Supp.
22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978, 981 (C.D.
Cal. 1978), aff'd., 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Azzaro v.
Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
118. See Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. at 982 ("Community property laws do not act as an
assignment but rather prescribe property rights in pension benefits as between spouses."); Cody,
594 F.2d at 317 ("[E]nforcing court ordered family support obligations ... [is] not in conflict
with ERISA's anti-alienation clause.").
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prevent business creditors from seizing the retirement benefits. 1 9 Unlike a
former spouse of a plan participant, the business creditor has only himself
to blame for extending credit to an individual whose property interests are
beyond the creditor's reach. Such a creditor, therefore, does not deserve an
exception to the anti-alienation clause as does a former spouse.2 0 The courts
further reasoned that the basic purpose of ERISA is to protect the millions
of people who depend on benefits from private pension plans for financial
independence after retirement. Family members, including ex-spouses of
participants, are within the class which ERISA protects.' 2' Therefore, an
interpretation of section 1056(d)(1) which prevents the non-participant spouses
from enforcing marital property obligations would frustrate the policies of
the anti-alienation provision.' 22
The United States Supreme Court, in Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v.
Campa,'3 resolved this conflict in favor of the state courts' interpretation
of ERISA's preemption and anti-alienation clauses. In Campa, pension funds
were joined to marriage dissolution actions and the California courts ordered
the respective plans to pay three non-participant spouses a portion of each
pension payment receivable by their respective spouses.'1 Representatives of
the pension funds appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that ERISA
precluded state courts from ordering such payments directly from the fund.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question. 25 Because the Supreme Court's dismissal of Campa was a decision
on the merits, the state courts won the battle over the scope of ERISA'
preemption and anti-alienation clauses. 26
With ERISA's preemption and anti-alienation clauses cast aside, the door
opened to judicial activism in the treatment of retirement benefits upon
divorce. The purported "line" between pension administration and pension
distribution began to fade. Progressively, state domestic relations orders
interfered more with the pension plans' administration.'27 The interference
119. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 925. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18-19,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnmN. NEws 2547, 2564-65.
120. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 926-27 ("Depriving business creditors of recourse against this
kind of asset is fair .... ").
121. See, e.g., id.; Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 124.
122. See Bonavich, supra note 23, at 35; See also Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 124; Stone,
450 F. Supp. at 926.
123. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
124. Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 116. Similar conclusions were reached in two earlier cases:
Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978); In re Marriage
of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980).
125. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
126. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). When the Court finds that the state
court decision is correct, the appeal will be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Id. at 343-45.
127. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 63:131
RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT
placed additional costs on plans and threatened the financial foundation of
the private pension system. 28 State courts compelled pension funds to pay
benefits directly to non-participant spouses who were awarded a portion of
their spouses' interest. 129 One appellate court went so far as to uphold a
trial court's order precluding a fund from honoring an employee election to
receive a joint and survivor annuity for the benefit of a subsequent surviving
spouse. 30 Such an election would reduce the monthly income payable during
the participant's life and would consequently reduce the former spouse's
awarded interest in the benefits. 3' Another decision compelled a plan ad-
ministrator to cancel a participant's previously elected form of benefit even
though the participant had already retired and benefits were in pay status. 3 2
The above court decisions failed to consider the negative impact upon the
private pension fund administration caused by paying benefits to someone
other than the participant, changing the form of benefits already in pay
status, or changing the nature of the plan contract. 33 At least one court
addressed these consequences and refused to award a non-participant spouse
an interest in the participant's pension. 34 The court held that it lacked
authority to rewrite contractual obligations between participants and their
employers who sponsor the pension plans because such an action would
discriminate against other plan participants and abuse fund assets.' 5 Either
result would be potentially detrimental to all plan participants and theirfamilieS.136
B. REA: A Response to Judicial Activism
The foregoing analysis of some post-ERISA, pre-REA decisions suggests
that, while attempting to protect non-participant spouses against later fi-
nancial insecurity, these decisions actually increased the risk that these in-
dividuals would be unprotected. By placing constraints on, and continuing
to interfere with, pension fund administration, the courts inadvertently en-
hanced the possibility that private pension plans, unable to absorb the
128. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 920; General Dynamics Corp., 581 S.W.2d at 301.
130. In re Marriage of Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. Rptr. 535, cert. denied,
446 U.S. 951 (1979).
131. Under REA, both spouses must partake in the election of such options. 29 U.S.C. §
1055(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
132. Ball, 522 F. Supp. 718.
133. The court in Kronschnabel, expressly stated that the administrative burden and increased
cost imposed upon the pension fund are insufficient considerations. 460 F. Supp. at 983.
134. In Monsanto, the court recognized the adverse effects and discrimination as against
other plan participants caused by an award to the non-participant. 534 F. Supp. at 54.
135. Id. at 53-54.
136. Id.
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additional burdens and costs, would terminate. 37 The elimination of private
pension plans under growing judicial activism would not only be detrimental
to non-participating spouses, but also to participants and their families
subsequent to divorce, as well as to married participants and their families.
ERISA's objective of creating a favorable environment for the maintenance
and establishment of private pensions would be destroyed. The bottom line
is evident: the class of people the courts intended to help actually have
been hurt. 38
However, the problems associated with ERISA should not lead one to
conclude that a non-participant spouse should not be awarded a portion of
his or her former spouse's pension benefits. These problems merely suggest
that a middle ground needs to be reached. REA provides that middle ground
by setting limitations on the courts' creativity in issuing a domestic relations
decrees. In general, under REA, a domestic relations decree cannot force a
plan to pay benefits in a form or at a time when the benefits would not
otherwise be payable. 39 As a result, the financial security of private pension
plans should be ensured.
C. REA's Express Limitations on Court Orders
The major purposes of REA are to facilitate the delivery of retirement
benefits, and to provide for greater equity under the private pension system
for employees and their families. 40 The Act "tak[es] into account changes
in work patterns, [and] the status of marriage as an economic partnership
of spouses who work both in and outside the home . . . . ",4' Under REA,
former spouses of private-sector employees are likely to obtair their fair
share of pension benefits in divorce actions. 42 However, REA's success
remains speculative and will largely depend upon the manner in which state
courts apply and interpret the Act.
137. Since 1980, more than 500 pension plans have been terminated. Pension Plan Termi-
nations Increase, PENsIoN WORLD, July 1986, at 12.
138. Pensions are very technical and complex, and family law practitioners and judges often
know little about them. Bloss, Don't Forget the Pension Plan in a Divorce, 71 A.B.A. J. 86
(Nov. 1985). Thus many courts may not have recognized the negative effects of their decrees.
Even pension policy makers have a difficult time confronting pension issues because they are
complicated and time-consuming. Borzi, What Plans Can Expect From the 98th Congress,
PENSION WORLD, Apr. 1984, at 41-42.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i)-(iii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
140. S. RaP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2547.
141. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2547, 2547.
142. Park, supra note 33, at 9.
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The significant amendments to ERISA 1 *4 and the Internal Revenue Code144
for purposes of this Note are embodied in section 104 of REA. 41 Section
104 provides special rules for the assignment of pension rights in divorce
proceedings. 146 For individuals married at least one year, 47 section 104 pro-
vides a clear statutory exemption from ERISA's anti-assignment clause. 14
Like ERISA, REA promotes the national policy of assuring individuals
adequate retirement income by permitting non-participant spouses to collect
directly from the plan, provided that the domestic relations order is "qual-
ified.' ' 49 A qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) creates, or recognizes
the existence of, an "alternative payee's rights,"'' 0 or assigns to an alternate
payee the right to receive all or part of a participant's retirement benefits.'-'
Although a detailed analysis of the requirements for establishing a QDRO
is beyond the scope of this Note, 52 a description of the basic principles
governing such orders is essential to an understanding of the problems which
the QDRO solves. In order for a domestic relations order to achieve the
status of a QDRO and thereby qualify for the benefits of the exemption,
REA establishes simple procedures that must be followed.' 3 In addition to
complying with these procedures, the decree must not attempt to order either
a payment form or option not otherwise available, 5 4 a payment to the non-
participant spouse greater than the participant is entitled to receive, 15 5 or a
payment of a benefit to the non-participant spouse that is supposed to be
paid to another, 5 6 such as payment to a previous spouse under an earlier
QDRO.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
144. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), amended by Act of Oct. 22, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9602 (West Supp. 1987).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (Supp. 1985); 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13) (West Supp. 1987).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). See also S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 18-19,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmNI. NEws 2547, 2564-65.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F)(ii).
148. Park, supra note 33, at 9.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K). "The term 'alternate payee' means any spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations
order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits ....." Id.
150. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), (II). "[Tlhe term 'qualified domestic relations order' means a
domestic order ... which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to,
or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan .... Id.
151. Id.
152. For a general overview of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), see Park, supra
note 33 and Bloss, supra note 138.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)-(iv). Some of the procedures that must be followed include
providing the names of the spouses, their respective addresses, the percentage of interest payable
to the alternate payee, and the number of payments. Id.
154. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i). The DRO, for example, cannot request a lump sum payment
from the pension fund if the participant is not entitled to a lump sum payment.
155. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii). For example, the DRO cannot include an early retirement subsidy
if the participant has not yet begun receiving the subsidy benefits.
156. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(iii).
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If the domestic relations order purports to do any of the above, then the
assignment of benefits to the non-participant spouse is prohibited under
ERISA as an alienation of benefits.' 5 7 However, REA permits one exception.
In response to several state court decrees ordering employees to take an early
retirement so their former spouses could begin receiving their awarded por-
tion of the pension benefits, REA permits a non-participant spouse to begin
receiving his or her portion at the participant's earliest retirement date even
though the participant has not retired.15
D. Who Should Pay the Costs of the Qualified Domestic
Relations Orders
REA protects the interests of the private pension system, plan participants,
former spouses of plan participants, and plan administrators. By setting
forth clear guidelines for QDROs, REA limits the courts' interference with
the administration of private pension funds. 5 9 However, REA may not be
a panacea because it too places increased costs and burdens on the plans.
Fund administrators must determine if the domestic relations order is qual-
ified,' ° establish procedures to ensure that more benefits are not paid out
than collectively entitled,' 6' and distribute the benefits to two or more in-
dividuals, depending on the number of times the participant remarries and
divorces. 162 Since these increased burdens on the plan administrator are costly,
the question arises whether it is fair for the pension plans to absorb the
costs. 163
Initially, one might propose that participants and alternate payees utilizing
the QDRO should bear the cost since they alone benefit. By placing the cost
on them, other plan participants are not penalized and their benefits are not
jeopardized due to the divorces of participants. Moreover, placing the cost
on the participant and alternate payee could easily be implemented under a
157. Section 1056(d)(1) of ERISA provides that "[e]ach pension plan [subject to ERISA]
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Id. §
1056(d)(1). Section 104 of REA, however, provides in part that section 1056(d)(1) "shall not
apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order." Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
158. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(I).
159. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. See also Mazo, Women and Pensions:
What Congress is Doing About Them, PENSION WORLD, Feb. 1984, at 32.
160. Additional burdens placed on the plan administrators can be found throughout 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)-(H), which was passed in the name of women's rights with almost no
opposition, and has increased the expenses and administrative burdens of most qualified plans.
Wodtke, supra note 24, at 41.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)-(H).
162. Id.
163. For a discussion of some of the additional responsibilities of the plan administrator
that may increase the costs of administration significantly, see Park, supra note 33, at 11-12
and Comment, supra note 7, at 174-75.
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defined contribution pension since individual accounts are maintained.164
However, by placing the costs on divorced participants and their former
spouses, the class of people the QDRO is supposed to help would be deterred
from using it, and thus they would prefer the present cash value method or
reserved jurisdiction method. Not only would such a result be counter-
productive, but the QDRO would frustrate both ERISA's and REA's goals.
After the initial confusion surrounding QDROs settles, plan administrators
will have established procedures to minimize the costs of the relatively new
Act. Of course this enhances the position that users of a QDRO should bear
its cost; however, pension funds are better situated to spread the costs among
a larger pool of individuals benefiting from pensions. Thus, pension funds
should absorb the additional costs, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of
the QDRO and minimizing the QDRO's administrative costs.
TV. THE COMPROMSE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS:
NON-PARTICIPANT AND PARTICIPANT SPOUSES
As previously discussed, the two schemes for dividing pension benefits
upon dissolution of a marriage, the present cash value method and the
reserved jurisdiction method, have many limitations in protecting each spouse's
competing interest in the benefits. 65 As the following discussion will dem-
onstrate, Section 104 of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) eliminates
these limitations. First, this Note will discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages that the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) possesses in com-
parison to the reserved jurisdiction method, highlighting the similar
characteristics of these two methods. The analysis will indicate that in the
future, courts should be inclined to utilize the QDRO, and as a result, the
reserved jurisdiction method may become obsolete. Second, this Note will
discuss the advantages and disadvantages that the QDRO possesses in com-
parison to the present cash value method. Finally, this Note will examine
the role that state courts and legislatures should play in dividing pension
benefits between the parties to a marital dissolution.
A. The QDRO Versus the Reserved Jurisdiction Method
The QDRO possesses many advantages, compared to the reserved juris-
diction method, in dividing pension benefits between former spouses. Both
164. In a "defined contribution plan," each individual's pension is maintained in a separate
account and as a result, each participant could be charged with the costs of administration.
See supra note 35. However, imposing costs on the participant and alternate payee under a
"defined benefit plan" would be difficult since the pension benefits of all participants in the
plan are pooled together. See supra note 42.
165. See supra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.
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approaches avoid the difficulties of valuing the pension benefits at the time
of the dissolution, since the only formula for division is determined at the
time of the dissolution, while the benefits are not actually divided until they
are receivable by the plan participant. In addition, both approaches place
the risks of non-vesting or plan termination on both spouses. Finally, each
method provides some security for the non-participant spouse. However,
under a QDRO this last advantage is greatly enhanced. This is obvious when
comparing the QDRO's advantages against the limitations of the reserved
jurisdiction method.
As noted in Part II, the reserved jurisdiction method has six major prob-
lems: 1) it requires continued transactions between the divorced parties; 2)
it raises difficulties in enforcement; 3) a non-participant must wait until the
participant elects to retire in order to receive his or her share of the benefits;
4) later-elected plan options may adversely affect the non-participant's awarded
interest without his or her consent; 5) the participant may predecease the
non-participant causing the benefits to cease and leaving the non-participant
spouse with an inadequate means of support; and 6) the non-participant
may predecease the participant. 166 Utilization of a QDRO eliminates most
of these problems.
Under a QDRO, a non-participant spouse is an "alternate payee" and a
"beneficiary."' 167 With alternate payee and beneficiary status, a non-partic-
ipant is entitled to receive payments directly from the plan.'6 Furthermore,
transactions between the divorced couple terminate at the time the marriage
is dissolved, and enforceability problems associated with continued relations
between often hostile parties are eliminated. As to enforceability problems
associated with the plan itself, the status of beneficiary and alternate payee
allows the non-participant spouse to sue the plan, 69 to claim attorney's fees
for breach of fiduciary duties, 7 0 and to obtain information from the plan.' 7'
Further, the non-participant is entitled to payment of benefits pursuant to
the QDRO at the participant's earliest possible retirement age even though
the participant has not yet retired.'7 Thus, the non-participant maintains
some control over the pension portion of the marital estate.
Provisions for pre-retirement survivor's benefits and post-retirement sur-
vivor's benefits may be incorporated into the QDRO, 7 3 thereby protecting
the non-participant if the participant dies. These provisions prevent the
166. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
167. Park, supra note 33, at 9 n.5 (discussing the status of a "beneficiary," as created by
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J) (Supp. III 1985)).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
169. Id. § 1132(a)(1).
170. Id. § 1132(g)(1).
171. Id. § 1021.
172. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(E), (I).
173. See Park, supra note 33, at 11.
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participant from recovering a windfall if the non-participant dies, because
the election of survivor benefits reduces the amount of monthly payments
to the participant. Finally, plan administrators must annually notify the
alternate payee of accrued benefits which may be forfeited if the participant
dies. 74 The notification gives the alternate payee knowledge of the status of
his or her share of the benefits and allows the non-participant to make other
financial arrangements for retirement security.
Courts should be less inclined to dispose of pension rights under the
reserved jurisdiction method now that the QDRO exists. The QDRO offers
the same advantages of the reserved jurisdiction method while eliminating
most of its problems. Therefore, courts will merely have to determine whether
the present cash value method or the QDRO offers greater advantages to
the parties.
B. The QDRO Versus the Present Cash Value Method
The present cash value method has three major advantages over the re-
served jurisdiction method. The present cash value method: 1) finalizes
transactions between divorced couples; 2) awards benefits to the spouses
from whose employment they derive; and 3), awards an immediate off-set
of property to non-participants. 175 Like the present cash value method, the
QDRO allows for transactions between the parties to terminate, since the
non-participant receives his or her share directly from the plan and not the
participant.176 However, the QDRO does not include the latter two advantages
discussed above.
Nevertheless, the three limitations of the present cash value method, as
against the reserved jurisdiction method, are the same limitations with respect
to the QDRO: valuation difficulties, vesting risks borne solely by the par-
ticipant, and failure to provide adequate security for the non-participant's
later years. Thus, a close examination of the present cash value method's
three disadvantages can help indicate when the method should, and should
not be used. 7 7 Whether a QDRO is preferable over the present cash value
method depends on such things as the divorcing couple's needs, years of
marriage, type of pension plan, and the benefit stage of vesting and maturity.
For example, a lump sum award to a non-employee spouse is preferable
where there are substantial amounts of other assets and the retirement either
has occurred or is imminent. 178 If the parties have been married a long time
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1025(c).
175. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
176. See Bloss, supra note 138, at 87.
177. For a discussion of the present cash value method's disadvantages, see supra notes 96-
101 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 439, 599 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1979).
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and the benefits are in a defined benefit plan, then the QDRO may be
preferable to the present cash value method. 79
C. Appropriate Steps State Legislatures and Courts Should Take
A QDRO provides courts with another alternative for disposing of marital
interests in pension benefits. Retirement benefits are an important and unique
asset of the marital relationship: they guarantee financial security, whereas
most other marital assets are only for immediate consumption. Under ER-
ISA, the federal government has encouraged more participation in private
pensions. 80 State legislatures can aid this national policy by: 1) acknowl-
edging all retirement benefits as marital property; and 2) adopting clear
criteria to guide trial courts when determining the appropriate allocation of
benefits between the parties.
Primarily, legislation should be drafted which recognizes all retirement
benefits earned during the marriage, regardless of vestment or maturity stage,
to be property of both spouses. Classification of retirement benefits into
stages of vesting and maturity arbitrarily draws lines which should not be
drawn. Categorizing unvested, non-matured benefits as "too speculative"
ignores the fact that these benefits are valuable property rights. Valuation
of the benefits is often difficult to calculate; however, this difficulty should
not alter one's right to receive the benefits once they are determined to be
property of the marriage. Damage calculations involving similar types of
probabilities and estimations are made in other areas of the law and should
be made in domestic cases as well.
Upon dissolution of a marriage, it is desirable that the benefits should be
divided between the parties in some reasonable manner. Some state legis-
latures are re-evaluating their statutes with this objective in mind. s' For
instance, in 1985, the Indiana General Assembly took steps toward this goal
by amending the "Definitions" section' 82 of the Dissolution of Marriage
Act.8 3 However, the General Assembly failed to take all the necessary steps
since the amended version only incorporates vested, matured benefits and
vested, non-matured benefits into the Act's definition of property. 84 Until
state legislatures, such as Indiana's, overcome their reluctance to incorporate
unvested, non-matured benefits into their states' property definitions, non-
participant spouses will continue to be precluded from valuable property
interests.
179. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 31-1-11.5-1 to -24 (Supp. 1986).
182. IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-2.




State legislatures should establish clear guidelines for courts to follow
when the disposition of retirement benefits is at issue. These guidelines should
reflect the uniqueness of this important marital asset: an asset that has
enduring value to the beneficiary and provides income for the recipient's
retirement years. Most states already have statutes setting forth factors to
be considered when dividing a marital estate. 85 Unfortunately these factors
are generic in character and not promulgated with an eye toward the dis-
position of pension benefits. Moreover, these factors are usually unaccom-
panied by instructions as to the weight to be accorded each, and consequently
fail to recognize the stark fact that many non-participant spouses will be
dependent on the state during retirement.
New guidelines should be adopted which pertain solely to the disposition
of pension benefits. These rules must give specific instructions on the weight
to be afforded each factor in light of the state's interest in preventing non-
participant spouses from being a public burden in later years and in providing
non-participant spouses with what they considered mutual security during
the marriage's duration. The determinative factor should be whether the
non-participant will have the opportunity to participate in some kind of
retirement or pension plan in the future. By enacting this type of legislation,
instead of concentrating the wealth of these benefits in employee spouses,
legislatures can spread retirement benefits among former spouses, thereby
alleviating some of the disparity among citizens' wealth during their retire-
ment years.
State courts play an indispensible role when disposing of retirement benefits
between divorcing spouses. Many courts are granted wide discretion to decide
the temporal question of when to divide the pension benefits of an employee
spouse. Presently, the majority of courts prefer the present cash value method.
However, with the availability of the QDRO, courts should evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of each method of dividing pension benefits,
and should rely on the method that most reasonably meets the needs of
both the plan participant and the non-participant spouse.
185. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(c)(1) to (5). An Indiana trial court is mandated to
consider the following five factors in determining a just and reasonable disposition of the
marital assets:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, including the con-
tribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse prior to the marriage or
through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time disposition of the property is to
become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to
dwell in that residence for such periods as the court may deem just to the spouse having custody
of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation
of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to a final division of property
and final determination of the property rights of the parties. Id.
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When confronted with the division and disposition of a pension benefits
during dissolution proceedings, courts should select the division and distri-
bution methods which best suit the particular circumstances of the case,
giving due regard to the uniqueness of the marital asset. Special attention
should be given to the needs of the non-participant spouses since these
individuals are more susceptible to financial insecurity in future years. 8 6 If
the trial court determines a lump sum award would best serve the interests
of the parties, then an immediate award of money or other marital asset of
equivalent value should be allocated to the non-participant spouse. However,
if in its determination the court concludes that the non-participant spouse
is unlikely to have an opportunity to save adequately for retirement, obtain
gainful employment providing a retirement program, or obtain resources to
ensure financial independence, and is likely to be a public burden in his or
her retirement years, then a portion of the benefits should be awarded to
the non-participant spouse through the use of a QDRO.
This Note does not suggest that state courts in divorce proceedings are
the proper forum in which to solve the growing problem of poverty among
elderly citizens. However, retirement benefits accrued during a marriage
constitute shared wealth which parties to marriage consider to be their mutual
security. Upon divorce, these pension benefits should be distributed pro-
portionately between the spouses. Thus, state courts can help promote the
national public policy of assuring that individuals have sufficient income to
meet their needs during their retirement years.
CONCLUSION
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 is a Congressional response to dam-
aging judicial interference with private pension plan administration. Court
decisions that occurred after the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
was enacted, but prior to the passage of REA, frustrated ERISA's underlying
policies by threatening to tip the delicate balance between the national
regulation of pensions and the voluntary nature of the private pension system.
Section 104 of REA is a compromise which balances the competing interests
of participant and non-participant spouses, while ensuring an atmosphere in
which the private pension system can survive.
State legislatures and courts should recognize private retirement benefits
as marital property regardless of vesting or maturity stages. Moreover, re-
defined guidelines should be adopted to ensure that benefits are distributed
in light of national policy. Futhermore, non-participant spouses should be
afforded greater protection due to their susceptibility to financial insecurity
in their later years and their reliance, during the marriage, on the plan
186. See Park, supra note 33, at 9. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 167-71.
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participant's pension benefits. The unique characteristics of private pension
plans may prevent some of the financial dependency of these individuals on
the state if reasonable plans, such as use of the qualified domestic relations
order, are utilized in dividing and disposing of pension benefits when mar-
riages are dissolved.
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